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 Quantifying Cognitive Biases in Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a formal model of analyst earnings forecasts that discriminates between 
rational behavior and that induced by cognitive biases. In the model, analysts are Bayesians who issue 
sequential forecasts that combine new information with the information contained in past forecasts. The 
model enables us to test for cognitive biases, and to quantify their magnitude. We estimate the model 
and find strong evidence that analysts are overconfident about the precision of their own information 
and also subject to cognitive dissonance bias. But they are able to make corrections for bias in the 
forecasts of others. We show that our measure of overconfidence varies with book-to-market ratio in a 
way consistent with the findings of Daniel and Titman (1999). We also demonstrate the existence of 
these biases in international data. 
 
  
Quantifying Cognitive Biases in Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 
Introduction 
Earnings forecasts are an important source of information for security valuation. Almost 
all valuation models use such forecasts explicitly or implicitly as an input in some way or 
another. Analyst forecasts have been shown to be more accurate than univariate time series or 
other naïve forecast methods (Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown et al., 
1987) and to have economic value for investors (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1984). But many 
investigators have found that the forecasts are biased (overly optimistic) (for example Stickel 
1990, Abarbanell 1991, Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt 1999) and inefficient in the way that 
they incorporate new information (DeBondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; LaPorta, 1996; 
Zitzewitz, 2001a). Our focus in this paper is explicitly on the latter source of bias. Our aim is to 
throw further light on the nature of the inefficiency and on its economic significance. 
More specifically, we present evidence relevant for assessing recent asset pricing models 
that have relaxed the assumption of full rationality in order to provide explanations for certain 
persistent features of the data that are not adequately explained by the standard theory (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; Odean, 1998; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) develop a behavioral model based on the 
assumption that investors display overconfidence and self-attribution bias with respect to their 
private information about stock returns. Overconfidence causes them to attach excessive weight 
to private relative to public information. Self-attribution bias refers to the tendency to attribute 
success to skill and failure to misfortune and accentuates the effect of overconfidence in the short 
run. The model generates asset prices that display short-horizon momentum and long-horizon 
mean reversion. It also predicts that the magnitude of the short-horizon momentum effect will 
depend upon the severity of the investor’s overconfidence and self-attribution bias. 
If investors are overconfident in their assessment of private information, then we would 
expect to observe similar biases in the way that security analysts process information to produce 
earnings forecasts. Our model of security analyst earnings forecasts contrasts rational and biased 
forecasts. In addition to overconfidence we consider another bias extensively documented in the 
psychology literature, that of cognitive dissonance. An individual who is overconfident 
overestimates the precision of his private information. Cognitive dissonance can be characterized 
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by the proposition that individuals tend to acquire or perceive information to conform with a set 
of desired beliefs.1 Thus if an analyst issues an optimistic earnings forecast on the basis of 
favorable private information, she will have a tendency to interpret subsequent information in 
such a way as to support or conform to the prior belief.2  We develop a series of tests that 
identify and measure both the information content and cognitive biases in earnings forecasts. 
Notably, both of these measures are independent of asset prices and the momentum effect.3 
Using data on individual analyst forecasts, we estimate the model and find strong evidence of 
both overconfidence and cognitive dissonance in analyst earnings forecasts.  
 
I. An Empirical Measure of Forecast Inefficiency 
 To provide some initial motivation we consider a simple atheoretic approach to 
measuring forecast inefficiency. A fundamental property of an optimal forecast is that it is not 
possible to improve the accuracy of the forecast by conditioning on any information available at 
the time the forecast is made. In particular, if we observe a sequence of earnings forecasts, then 
we should not be able to increase the precision of the ith forecast by conditioning on earlier 
forecasts. 
We examine this question by comparing the precision of the ith quarterly earnings 
forecast with that of forecasts conditioned also on earlier forecasts. If analyst forecasts are 
efficient, then the ith forecast  will be the optimal predictor of actual time t earnings, .  In 
particular, the i
i
ttF 1, − tA
th forecast  will efficiently combine information from past forecasts ittF 1, −
1
11,
−
=−
i
j
j
ttF , as well as the i
th  analyst’s own private information.  The precision of the ith forecast 
will therefore exceed the precision obtainable by mechanically combining past forecasts, 
1
11,
−
=−
i
j
j
ttF .  Also, since the i
th forecast optimally combines past forecasts and the ith analyst’s own 
private information, it will not be possible to improve upon the ith forecast by mechanically 
combining the ith  forecast with past forecasts.   
 We look at the precision of three forecasting variables, where precision is defined as the 
inverse mean squared forecast error (Greene, 1997).4  The first forecasting variable, labeled 
, is simply the i1 1, −ttFV
th  analyst’s forecast of time t earnings, .  The second forecasting 
variable, labeled , is a predictor of time t earnings obtained by regressing time t earnings 
i
ttF 1, −
2
1, −ttFV
 2 
 
on lagged forecasts 111,
−
=−
i
j
j
ttF , all of which are observable when the i
th  analyst issues her forecast 
.  The third variable, labeled , is a predictor of time t earnings obtained by regressing 
time t earnings on lagged forecasts and the i
i
ttF 1, −
3
1, −ttFV
th  analyst’s forecast.  Forecasting parameters for 
 and  are re-estimated each quarter, using all earnings data from previous quarters.  
2
1, −ttFV
3
1, −ttFV
The precisions are plotted sequentially by forecast order in Figure 1. The figure 
demonstrates that the ith analyst’s forecast precision is lower than the forecast precision 
obtainable by either mechanical forecasting method. Figure 2 plots the percentage difference 
between  (the i1 1, −ttFV
th analyst’s forecast) and  (which recombines the i3 1, −ttFV
th  analyst’s 
forecast and past forecasts). The magnitude of the loss of accuracy in the forecast is large, 
ranging from around 10% for early forecasts to over 20% for late forecasts. The models 
developed in Sections III and IV provide an explanation for the observed inefficiency in terms of 
cognitive biases. 
 
II. Related Literature  
A.  Optimistic Forecast Bias  
Some research suggests that analyst forecasts exhibit an optimistic bias. That is, the 
average analyst earnings forecast exceeds actual earnings (Stickel 1990, Abarbanell 1991, 
Easterwood and Nutt 1999). The apparent optimistic bias may be due to incentive conflicts,5 
may be rational,6 or may simply reflect measurement error.7 The bias has been identified in 
consensus forecasts (Lim 2001) and is more pronounced at longer forecast horizons (e.g. one 
year) than at shorter horizons (e.g. one month) (Richardson et al. 1999). We find evidence of an 
optimistic bias consistent with previous work but our primary focus is on biases of over- or 
underreaction.   
 
B. Inefficient Use of Information 
The second set of biases involves over- and underreaction to information. That is, when 
analysts incorporate new information into their forecasts, the new information does not receive 
the rational Bayesian weight. This phenomenon may be due to cognitive biases or incentive 
conflicts. 
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Several theoretical papers have focused explicitly on the effects of performance-based 
incentives on analyst forecast behavior. Predictions tend to be sensitive to the assumptions of the 
model. Trueman (1994) finds that analysts will display a tendency to “herd” on the consensus, 
underweighting their own information. Other papers identify different circumstances under 
which one would observe either herding or exaggeration (Ehrbeck and Waldmann, 1996; 
Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2001). 
Empirical evidence is also mixed. Lamont (1995) and Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) 
find a relationship between job tenure and herding among forecasters, in which the less 
experienced are more likely to follow the herd. Graham (1999) in contrast examines asset 
allocation recommendations of investment newsletters and finds evidence that the incentive to 
herd increases with analyst reputation. Zitzewitz (2001a) argues that analysts systematically 
exaggerate their difference from the consensus. 
A number of studies have also suggested that cognitive biases cause analysts to deviate 
from rational Bayesian updating. DeBondt and Thaler (1990) argue that analysts tend to 
overreact and form extreme expectations. Others find that current analyst forecasts are 
predictable from past stock returns (Klein 1990) or past analyst forecast errors (Mendenhall 
1991, Abarbanell and Bernard 1992), and suggest that analysts tend to underreact to new 
information. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Chen and Jiang (2005) find that analysts overreact 
to positive news but underreact to negative news, thus appearing systematically overoptimistic. 
Shane and Brous (2001) find evidence of correlation between forecast revisions and both prior 
forecast errors and prior forecast revisions, and conclude that analysts use non-earnings 
information to correct prior underreaction to information about future earnings.  This diversity of 
findings has not gone unnoticed by advocates of market efficiency. Fama (1998, p. 306) surveys 
the anomalies literature and argues that “in an efficient market, apparent underreaction will be 
about as frequent as overreaction. If anomalies are split randomly between underreaction and 
overreaction, they are consistent with market efficiency.” 
We choose to focus solely on the task of discriminating between rational forecasting 
behavior and that influenced by cognitive biases. However, we recognize that in certain 
circumstances the incentives to exaggerate private information or herd with the consensus may 
be difficult to distinguish from such cognitive biases since they induce analysts to report 
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forecasts which differ from their true expectations. We return to consider alternative 
explanations for our empirical findings in Section V. 
 
III. The Rational Model 
Analyst forecasts represent combinations of various pieces of public and private 
information. In this paper, we think of private information as encompassing traditional forms of 
private information (e.g. proprietary research) as well as the skillful interpretation of publicly 
available information. After time  earnings are announced, analysts sequentially issue one-
quarter-ahead forecasts of time t earnings . To capture public information about A
1−t
tA t available at 
time t-1, we introduce a statistical forecast of At which we denote : 1,ˆ −ttA
          (1) ( publictttt IAEA 11, |ˆ −− = )
1− Here, 
pI  contains any public information known to be able to forecast earnings, which 
of course includes lagged earnings. We model the sequential nature of forecasts by assuming that 
each analyst observes her own private signal as well as all forecasts previously issued.
ublic
t
8 The 
earnings innovation conditional on the public information used to generate the forecast 1,ˆ −ttA  is 
denoted tε . Thus 
          (2) tttt AA ε+= −1,ˆ
and tε , which can also be interpreted as a forecast error, is uncorrelated with . We assume 
that 
1,
ˆ −ttA
tε  is normally distributed with mean zero and variance . Then each analyst’s private 
information is represented by a signal about 
2
εσ
tε . Let  
           (3)  11,
i
tt
i
ttS −− += ηε
represent the ith private signal in order observed by the ith analyst. The signal is observed at some 
point during period , and provides information about the innovation 1−t tε . We assume that 
 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance it 1 −η ( )2iησ , and is uncorrelated with tε  and 
with , jt 1−η ij ≠ . This particular form for the signal is a convenient way of capturing the fact that 
 and i ttS 1, − tε  are correlated random variables, as of course must be true of any informative signal. 
It does not imply that tε  has been realized at time 1−t .  
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We also assume that  is public information, thus abstracting from the possibility that 
there may exist an incentive to provide an informative signal about  as a measure of skill.
i
ησ
i
ησ 9  In 
models where  is not public information, optimal forecasts may deviate from the rational 
forecast as we define it (see for example Trueman 1994; Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1996).  One 
may then want to think of what we call the rational model as the 
i
ησ
unbiased model. In Section V 
we consider the possibility that our results represent rational incentive-driven behavior. 
The ith analyst, having observed all previous forecasts, now updates her prior in the light 
of her private signal. Her Bayesian forecast of earnings at time t issued during period 1−t  is 
denoted . It is convenient at this point to introduce the notation ittF 1, − ( )21 ii ηη σπ ≡  for the 
precision of the ith private signal, and 21 εε σπ ≡  for the precision of the earnings innovation tε .  
Here, we assume that the analyst's loss function is such that the rational forecast equals the 
analyst's posterior expectation.10  
 Introducing the notation 
  
∑
=
+
= i
j
j
i
iw
1
ηε
η
ππ
π
        (4) 
forecasts of earnings changes can be expressed in the following way (see Appendix A.1): 
( )( ) 1 1,111,111 1, ˆ1 −−−−− +−−=− tttttttt SwAAwAF  
 ( )( ) i ttitittititt SwAFwAF 1,111,11, 1 −−−−−− +−−=−   …,2=i   (5) 
This has a straightforward interpretation. Bayesian forecasts can be expressed as 
weighted averages of prior mean and observed signal. In a world in which all analysts make 
rational forecasts, private information is correctly incorporated into each forecast. Thus each 
analyst will treat the immediately preceding forecast as her prior mean and earlier forecasts will 
have no independent effect on the current forecast. Even though signals are private information, 
it is sufficient that only the forecasts are observable for all information to be efficiently 
incorporated into successive forecasts. 
Substituting for  we can rewrite (5) as: i ttS 1, −
( ) 1 1111,11 1, ˆ1 −−− ++−= tttttt wAwAwF η  
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   ( ) ititiittiitt wAwFwF 111,1, 1 −−−− ++−= η …,2=i     (6) 
These equations relate successive forecasts to realized earnings and place strong 
restrictions on the various coefficients, both within and across equations. The variances of the 
error terms  are constrained both because of the appearance of the coefficient  as a 
multiplicative factor and because  is a nonlinear function of the variances of all preceding 
private signal error terms. Note that the error term in (6) is uncorrelated with all right-hand-side 
independent variables. It is therefore a well-defined regression equation despite the 
unconventional appearance of the forecasted variable  on the right-hand-side. Moreover, the 
error term represents the individual analyst’s surprise after controlling for information contained 
in all previous forecasts. Thus, the error terms should not exhibit the serial correlation 
documented in Keane and Runkle (1998). 
i
tiw 1−η iw
iw
tA
Since the weight  is a function of signal precisions, which can be estimated from the 
variances of the error terms in (6), the rational model imposes restrictions on parameter estimates 
that allow us to test it against an alternative model with cognitive biases, which we describe in 
the next section. 
iw
 
IV. The Model with Cognitive Biases 
A. The model with overconfidence 
We retain the same basic structure laid out in Section III of the paper. Analysts observe 
previous forecasts and combine them with their own private information to produce their own 
forecasts. However we now assume that analyst i either over- or underestimates the precision of 
her own private signal.  The analyst perceives her private signal precision to be  where 
 measures the degree of bias. If  the analyst overestimates the precision of the signal, 
and if  she underestimates it. We describe these situations respectively as overconfidence 
and underconfidence, as in Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998).  The first analyst 
issues a forecast which misweights the first private signal,  
i
ia ηπ)1( +
ia 0>ia
0<ia
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 111
1
1
1,1
1
1
1
1,
1,
1, 1
1ˆ
1
1ˆ −−−− ++
++−++
+=− ttttttBtt a
a
AA
a
a
AF ηππ
π
ππ
π
ηε
η
ηε
η   (7) 
where the superscript B on the forecast stands for “biased”. 
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 Defining  
 
( )
( ) 11
1
1
1 1
1
ηε
η
ππ
π
a
a
wB ++
+=         (8) 
we can rewrite (7) as: 
 ( ) 1 111,11,1, 1, ˆˆ −−−− +−=− tBtttBttBtt wAAwAF η      (9) 
To describe how subsequent forecasts are made we need an assumption about whether 
analysts recognize the presence of bias in others. We consider the implications of the two 
possibilities.  
If analysts are unaware of the presence of bias in others they will treat previous forecasts 
as fully rational. We have shown in the previous section that this implies that analysts will form 
forecasts as weighted averages of the immediately preceding forecast change and the private 
signal, as in (5).  
 ( )( ) i ttBittiBttBittiBtt SwAFwAF 1,1,1, 1,1,, 1, ˆ1ˆ −−−−−− +−−=−     (10) 
In this situation the natural way to specify the “rational” weight is to base it on the 
empirical precision of the biased forecast. So if analysts are overconfident they will attach 
greater weight to the private signal than would be justified by the empirical precision. 
If on the other hand analysts recognize that the forecasts of others are biased, they will be 
able to make appropriate correction for the bias. Then one can show that forecasts take the form: 
  ( )( ) i ttBittittBittiBtt SwAFwAF 1,1,11,1,, 1, ˆ1ˆ −−−−−− +−−=−      (11) 
where 
  
( )
( )∑−
=
+++
+= 1
1
1
1
i
j
i
i
j
i
iB
i
a
a
w
ηηε
η
πππ
π
 
(see Appendix A.2) This has a natural interpretation. If analysts recognize that the forecasts of 
others are biased, then simply by observing past data on actual earnings changes and forecasts 
they can infer the magnitude of the bias. This allows them to correct for the presence of the bias 
and to infer what the unbiased forecast, , would be. We also show in the Appendix that the 
efficient forecasts depend on the biased forecasts in the following way: 
1
1,
−
−
i
ttF
  ( ) ( 21,
1
11,
1,
1
11
1, 1
−
−
−
−−
−
−
−−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ittB
i
iiB
ttB
i
ii
tt Fw
wF
w
wF )     (12) 
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By recursively substituting (12) into (11) one obtains an expression for the ith observed forecast 
that depends upon all previously observed forecasts. The weights on past forecasts decline in an 
approximately geometric fashion. For example, if 1=επ ,  and  for all i, we find 
that the pattern of weights on past forecasts is as shown in Figure 3. 
1.0=iηπ 1=ia
 This gives us a simple way to distinguish between the two hypotheses. We regress the ith 
forecast earnings change on all previous forecast changes and the actual earnings change. If 
analysts view the forecasts of others as unbiased then only the immediately preceding forecast 
and the actual earnings change should have non-zero coefficients. On the other hand, if analysts 
recognize and compensate for the bias in preceding forecasts, we will find non-zero coefficients 
on earlier forecasts. We report in Section V the results of such a test showing clearly that prior 
forecasts are not treated as if they were unbiased.  That is, analysts recognize the existence of 
bias in others, but not in themselves. 
 
B. Biases of Self-deception: Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance describes the psychological discomfort that accompanies evidence 
that contradicts one’s prior beliefs or world-view. To avoid this psychological discomfort, people 
tend to ignore, reject or reinterpret any information that conflicts with their prior beliefs. There 
are many studies that document this effect. For example, a study of the banking industry found 
that bank executive turnover predicted both provision for loan loss and the write-off of bad loans 
(Staw, Barsade and Koput, 1997). Higher turnover was associated with higher loan loss 
provision and more write-offs. The authors interpret this as evidence that the individuals 
responsible for making the original loan decisions exhibited systematic bias in their 
interpretation of information about the status of the loans. Scherbina and Jin (2005) describe a 
similar effect among mutual fund managers. New fund managers are more likely to sell 
momentum losers that they have inherited from their predecessors since they are not as 
committed to the investment decisions that led to those holdings. We hypothesize that earnings 
forecasts will be subject to a similar bias. If an analyst forms a favorable opinion of a company 
and issues an optimistic forecast, subsequent information will tend to be interpreted in a positive 
light, and conversely.  
To incorporate cognitive dissonance, we introduce a distinction between the true or 
objective signal and the perceived signal. The perceived signal is influenced by whether the 
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analyst has observed particularly favorable or unfavorable signals in the past. We model this 
effect by assuming that the perceived private signal  differs from the objective signal by a 
mean shift that is a linear function of the forecast error in the previous period. 
iB
ttS
,
1, −
( ) ( )12,111,12,11,, 1, ˆ −−−−−−−−−− −++−=−+= ti ttittttti tti ttiBtt AFkAAAFkSS η    (13) 
Thus a positive forecast error generated by an unduly optimistic forecast causes the analyst to 
interpret her private signal next period too favorably. The size of the bias is measured by the 
coefficient k. The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that k will be positive. 
With biases of overconfidence and cognitive dissonance the first analyst’s one-period-
ahead forecast is 
( )( 11, 2,11 11,1
1,
1,11,
1,
1,
ˆ
ˆ
−−−−−
−−−
−++−=
=−
t
B
tttttt
B
B
tt
B
tt
B
tt
AFkAAw
SwAF
η )     (14) 
where  is defined as before.Bw1
11
 Then the first efficient forecast is: 
  (( 11, 2,111,1, 1,
1
1
1,
1
1,
ˆˆ −−−−−−− −−−=− tB ttBttBttBtttt AFkwAFw
wAF ))   (15) 
If the second analyst recognizes the presence of both biases in the previous forecast, her forecast 
will be 
  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )2 112, 2,11,2
1
1,
2,111,
1,
1,
1
1
21,
2,
1,
ˆ
ˆ1ˆ
−−−−−
−−−−−−−
+−+−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−=−
tt
B
ttttt
B
t
B
tt
B
tt
B
ttB
B
tt
B
tt
AFkAAw
AFkwAF
w
wwAF
η
  (16) 
In general then the forecast of analyst i will depend on all prior forecasts for the current period 
and on the corresponding lagged forecasts. 
 
V. Estimation of the Rational Model 
A. Data 
Our data set consists of all quarterly earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S Detail History 
database from 1993-1999. Actual earnings are obtained from the I/B/E/S Actuals File. To ensure 
a minimum level of accuracy in our parameter estimates, firms must have at least twelve quarters 
of seasonally differenced earnings data to be included in our study. To eliminate potential 
outliers, we follow the literature and apply several cumulative data filters. Because the forecast 
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properties of “penny-stocks” may differ from the general sample, we remove observations when 
the stock price is below $5 (Filter A). To ensure that the forecasts in our study come from 
analysts actively following the forecasted firms, we remove observations for analysts who issue 
fewer than 25 forecasts over the entire sample period. We also remove forecasts occurring on 
multiple-forecast days, which we use as a proxy for large new pieces of public information 
(Filter B).12 We restrict our sample to all quarterly earnings forecasts issued since the most 
recent quarterly earnings announcement (Filter C). Finally, to mitigate concerns about the 
influence of outliers13, we eliminate forecasts more than 6 standard deviations from actual (Filter 
D). Eliminating the inexperienced analysts and “penny” stocks has virtually no impact on our 
results. Including multiple forecast days or extreme observations (forecasts more than 6 standard 
deviations from actual) makes our estimates noisier, but does not affect the qualitative nature of 
our results. 
 
B.  Pooling of Data 
Earnings vary considerably in both magnitude and volatility across firms. In addition, 
there exists significant cross-sectional variation in the firm-specific slope parameters in equation 
(11).  It is common to adjust seasonally-differenced earnings by price (Rangan and Sloan 1998; 
Easterwood and Nutt 1999; Keane and Runkle 1998) or by a rolling 8-period estimate of 
standard deviation (Bernard and Thomas 1990; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 1996). 
However, Friesen (2005) shows that cross-sectional variation in both the regression parameters 
and the scale of the underlying regression variables can lead to biased regression parameters.  
Friesen demonstrates that in many instances, normalizing by price fails to remove this 
variability, and as a result regression parameters estimated with price-normalized data may be 
biased.  Therefore, we normalize the data using a more stable firm-specific volatility measure as 
follows: For each firm, we fit an AR(2) model to seasonally differenced earnings.14 In particular, 
for each firm j, we estimate parameters for the model: 
( ) ( ) tjjtjtjjjtjtjjtjjtj AAAAAA ,6,2,2,5,1,1,4,, εμρμρμ +−−+−−++= −−−−−     (17) 
where ( )2,, ,~ εσε jtj oN . Following Bernard and Thomas (1990), we use the entire sample period 
to estimate the parameters. The estimated standard deviation, , is then used to normalize the 
firm’s earnings. We refer to data normalized in this way as sigma-normalized data.  
εσ ,j
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A possible objection to this method is that the normalizing factor is estimated using data 
not available at the time the forecast is made, possibly introducing a look-ahead bias.  If we were 
using the estimated normalizing factor to help forecast future realizations of a variable, this 
might indeed induce a look-ahead bias.  However, our regressions simply decompose the ith 
observed forecast into a weighted average of lagged forecasts and actual earnings. A second 
criticism is that our normalizing factor might be biasing the parameter estimates themselves.  
The key issue here is whether the normalizing factor, , is correlated with the regression 
parameter, 
εσ ,j
jβ .  We have checked this and found that the factor is uncorrelated with model 
parameters.   
Because our model predicts a specific relationship between forecast error variance and 
regression error variance, pooled parameter estimates must be based upon appropriately 
normalized data.  Both price-normalized and actual data have cross-sectional heteroskedasticity 
approximately four to seven times as severe as that of sigma normalized data. In light of this 
statistic and the results of Friesen (2005), we feel that our methodology is the most sensible way 
to achieve stability in the scale of variables across firms, while maintaining the relative 
dispersions required for calculating valid measures of within-firm variance. 
Table I provides some basic sample statistics for our data.  Panel A uses actual data, and 
panel B gives identical statistics for sigma-normalized data. Of particular interest is that moving 
from Filter C to Filter D has minimal impact on the mean, median and standard deviation of most 
variables, but the minimum and maximum values of analyst forecast and forecast error are 
significantly affected. Note the minimal impact on extreme values of actual earnings. Keane and 
Runkle (1998) eliminate outliers by removing actual earnings observations greater than 4 
standard deviations from the mean. By contrast, we eliminate all observations associated with 
forecast errors greater than 6 standard deviations from the mean.15 The most extreme values of 
actual earnings are unaffected, suggesting that analysts were able to forecast those extreme 
values no less accurately. Eliminating outliers based on extreme forecast errors removes the 
biggest true surprises. 
 
C.  A Comparison of the Rational and Cognitive Bias Models 
We are interested in distinguishing between three separate hypotheses: (i) forecasts are 
rational (ii) forecasts are biased and individuals do not recognize the bias in others (iii) forecasts 
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are biased but individuals do recognize the bias in others. Previous work has not explicitly 
attempted to discriminate between (ii) and (iii). However, our analysis in the previous section has 
shown that it is important to do this if we are to have a properly specified model.  
We first run the regressions described at the end of Section IV.A. We regress the iPth   
forecast earnings change on all previous forecast changes and the actual earnings change. As we 
argued above, if analysts view the forecasts of others as rational then only the immediately 
preceding forecast and the actual earnings change should have non-zero coefficients. The results 
presented in Table II show that this is clearly not the case. The weights on past forecasts decline 
in a way that is qualitatively similar to those illustrated in Figure 3, which were derived from a 
numerical example. This is evidence against both hypothesis (i) and hypothesis (ii). It also allows 
us to conduct a formal test to discriminate between (i) and (iii) using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). Since the rational and non-rational models are nested we can use the Newey-
West (1987) D-test to discriminate between them. The difference between the models is that in 
the rational model, the overconfidence and cognitive dissonance variables (a and k) are 
constrained to equal zero.  Technical details on the estimation procedure, including moment 
conditions and the specification of the D-test are contained in Appendix B.   
Estimating the models requires us to make several assumptions.  First, we assume that 
cognitive bias parameters are constant across analysts and through time.  As such, our estimates 
can be interpreted as measures of the average level of cognitive bias among analysts.  Second, 
private signal precision is aggregated across analysts, again yielding an estimate of the average 
signal precision for each ordered forecast.  Third, we ignore the effect of dissonance bias other 
than for the issuer of the current forecast.  That is, analyst i exhibits overconfidence and 
cognitive dissonance, and also recognizes and adjusts for overconfidence in previous forecasts.  
Analyst i does not adjust for the cognitive dissonance bias in other analyst forecasts.16  Fourth, in 
the biased model, the efficient consensus is calculated endogenously as a weighted average of all 
previously issued forecasts, where the weights are functions of the estimated cognitive bias 
parameters, as well as the estimated weights each past analyst placed on her private information. 
 The results from estimating the rational model and the model with cognitive biases are 
presented in Table III.17 The equations of the model are estimated with a constant to allow us to 
identify optimism bias. We find clear evidence of such a bias, although it declines steadily over 
the quarter and has disappeared by the eighth forecast and is replaced by a pessimism bias. Its 
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magnitude is very similar in both models. The most striking difference between the parameter 
estimates generated by the two models occurs for private signal precision. Figures for the 
rational model are consistently much larger than those for the model with bias.  To understand 
this result, it is helpful to think intuitively about the source of the parameter estimates.  In both 
models, the current (ith) forecast is generated by a weight on the efficient consensus and a weight 
on the private signal.  The weight on the private signal, along with the estimated regression error 
variance, yields an unbiased estimate of the precision of the ith signal.  The rational model 
imposes the additional restriction that private signal precision be internally consistent with the 
actual weight attached to the private signal. If the actual weight is set too high then this will 
introduce an upward bias in the estimate of private signal precision.  
The values of the cognitive bias parameters a and k are both positive and highly 
significant. The Newey-West D-test resoundingly rejects the rational model (p-value < 10-20). 
The parameter a has a value of 0.937 and a standard error of 0.027. This means that analysts 
attach roughly double the rational weight to their private information. The parameter k has a 
value of 0.079 and a standard error of 0.007. Thus an analyst’s past forecast error has an effect 
on her current forecast in the direction predicted by the theory of cognitive dissonance. If the 
previous forecast error was positive, indicating that the analyst’s private information was 
relatively favorable, the beliefs formed on the basis of this information induce a positive bias in 
the perception of the current private signal.  
However, the economic significance of the two variables differs. We can illustrate this by 
calculating the impact of overconfidence alone on forecast accuracy.  We compare the precision 
of the ith ordered forecast with the precision of the ith efficient consensus forecast.  The  (ith) 
efficient forecast is a weighted average of the current (ith) and past forecasts, with weights 
calculated according to equation (11).  The difference between the efficient forecast precision 
and the actual forecast precision represents the efficiency loss due to overweighting private 
information and cognitive dissonance biases.  Figure 4 expresses this efficiency loss as a 
percentage of the actual forecast precision.  The effect of analyst bias is dramatic, reducing 
forecast precision by 5% to 30% depending on forecast order. In contrast, the isolated effect of 
the dissonance parameter k is limited. If we look at the distribution of (non-normalized) forecast 
errors in our sample, we find that three quarters of all forecasts have an absolute error of 7 cents 
or less per share. For these forecasts a value of k = 0.1 produces a bias of less than one penny per 
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share. Five per cent of all forecasts have absolute errors of more than 28 cents. For these 
forecasts the bias is two cents per share or more.  
An interesting feature of our results is that analysts do not view the forecasts of others as 
fully rational, but do not extend this perception to correct the bias in their own forecasts. This is 
consistent with psychological theories that emphasize self-serving bias in causal attribution 
(Miller and Ross, 1975). This bias involves individuals attributing their own successes to skill 
and their failures to chance. The reason for the existence of such a bias may be that it enhances 
self-esteem and protects from the negative impact of a sense of failure. Additionally, it has been 
argued that there may be an effect working through expectations. If outcomes are as expected 
they are attributed to ability, and if they are not they are attributed to chance. Miller and Ross 
argue that people are more likely to expect to succeed rather than to fail in task-oriented 
situations, hence the tendency to believe that success is due to ability.  The presence of such a 
bias provides an explanation for the fact that individuals find it much more difficult to learn 
about biases in their own behavior than about those in others.   
 
VI.  Testing Predictions of the Cognitive Bias Model 
A. Theoretical Predictions of Incentive-Based and Psychological Models 
Our analysis of forecasting behavior assumes that analysts issue forecasts that correspond 
to their true expectations. However, several authors have argued that there may be various 
incentives which lead analysts to issue forecasts that deviate systematically from their true 
expectations. This question is typically examined in an environment in which analysts differ in 
ability. Those with low skill want to appear like those with high skill, but the latter want to 
differentiate themselves from the low skill group. Trueman (1994) constructs a model in which 
such incentives induce analysts to underweight their own private information and to display a 
propensity to “follow the herd”. If analysts are indeed subject to this pressure, then our measure 
of overconfidence is biased downwards, since our results demonstrate that the net effect of 
rational incentives and overconfidence leads to overweighting. There are a number of other 
papers not focused explicitly on analysts’ forecasts that also conclude that there are pressures to 
engage in herding behavior when actions such as investment decisions reveal information about 
ability (Scharfstein and Stein 1990, Prendergast and Stole 1996). 
 15 
 
Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) show that under different assumptions it is possible for a 
rational incentive for overweighting private information to emerge. However, in their model 
analysts make forecasts only over one or two periods. In such a situation using forecast accuracy 
as a measure of ability is relatively uninformative, since there is a large amount of sampling error 
and there is scope for the deviation of a forecast from the consensus to transmit significant 
additional information about private signal precision. So there is a tradeoff between the incentive 
to forecast accurately and the incentive to overweight one’s private information to signal that the 
information is more precise than it really is. However one would expect such an incentive to 
decline rapidly in significance the more forecasts an analyst makes.18 We include analysts in our 
sample only if they have made at least 25 forecasts. Many have made several hundred. For 
example, of the 3,594 analysts in our sample, the mean analyst issues 85 forecasts.  Twenty-five 
percent of our sample, or about 900 analysts, have issued at least 111 forecasts, while ten percent 
of our sample, or 359 analysts, have issued at least 213 forecasts.  In these circumstances it is not 
obvious why any significant incentive to exaggerate should persist.  We have shown above in 
Figures 4 and 5 that the effect of overconfidence on forecast accuracy is large. Given analysts’ 
clear incentive to issue accurate forecasts (Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1999) find that lower 
relative forecast accuracy increases an analyst’s chances of being fired), it would be implausible 
to attribute the observed behavior solely to signaling of ability. 
 We turn to considering additional implications of the cognitive bias model. The 
psychology literature consistently demonstrates that overconfidence tends to be most pronounced 
in situations where information is ambiguous and predictability is low (Griffin and Tversky 
1992) and the task is of moderate to extreme difficulty (Fischoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1982). 
Similarly, Clark's (1960) signal detection research suggests that individuals are most prone to 
overconfidence when the precision of a signal is low.  If our empirical estimates represent 
overconfidence, then cross-sectional variation in the estimates should be consistent with these 
findings.  Based on these studies, we hypothesize that overconfidence will be most pronounced 
for firms where information is ambiguous and the quality of information is low.   
Daniel and Titman (1999) use this prediction to generate an indirect test of the asset 
pricing model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) based on overconfidence. They 
argue that since valuation of low book-to-market (B-M) firms involves a greater degree of 
uncertainty and ambiguity, the findings from the psychology literature cited above imply that 
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overconfidence should be greater for this group of firms. The model predicts that momentum 
effects should be higher the higher the level of overconfidence, leading to the hypothesis that 
such effects should be higher for low B-M firms than for high B-M firms. They find strong 
evidence that this is the case. If their argument is correct we should find that our measure of 
overconfidence is higher among low B-M firms than high B-M firms. 
To examine this issue, we obtain B-M data from the Compustat Industrials file, and 
define the B-M ratio as the book value of equity (item 60) divided by the market value of equity 
(item 24 times item 25).  Forecasts are divided into high, low, and medium B-M quartiles based 
on the cross-sectional distribution of B-M ratios as of the previous fiscal year end.19  Following 
Fama and French (1992), we include a six-month lag between the previous fiscal year-end and 
our forecasts.  Thus, for a firm with a December fiscal year-end, the firm's forecasts issued 
between July 1 of year t and June 30 of year 1+t  are sorted based on the firm's B-M ratio as of 
the previous fiscal year-end ( ).   1−t
Table IV contains parameter estimates, and reveals a significant association between 
overconfidence and B-M ratios.  The value of a for low B-M firms is 1.04 with a standard error 
of 0.046, while for high B-M firms it is 0.75 with a standard error of 0.050.  Likewise, the 
cognitive dissonance bias is nearly twice as strong amongst low B-M firms.  The value of k for 
low B-M firms is 0.103 with a standard error of 0.014 versus a value for high B-M firms of 0.028 
with a standard error of 0.015.  Thus, the subset of firms for which Daniel and Titman (1999) 
find the strongest momentum effect also have the strongest cognitive biases. 
 
B.         Asymmetric Cognitive Dissonance Bias 
As with overconfidence, some studies have suggested that the correlation between current 
and lagged forecast errors, which we attribute to cognitive dissonance, may be due to incentives. 
For instance, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996, p.1710) suggest that “analysts are 
especially slow in revising their estimates in the case of companies with the worst performance. 
This may possibly be due to their reluctance to alienate management.” This leads one to predict 
that analysts will update their beliefs too slowly when their past forecasts have been too high, but 
will rationally update their beliefs when their forecasts have been too low. In contrast, cognitive 
dissonance theory suggests that analysts will be slow to update their beliefs regardless of the sign 
of past forecast error. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Kasznick and McNichols (2002) find 
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evidence consistent with the incentive argument: when analyst forecasts are too high, subsequent 
forecasts tend to stay too high; but when analyst forecasts are too low, subsequent forecasts are 
either unbiased (Kasznick and McNichols 2002), or become too high (Easterwood and Nutt 
1999).   
Following the methodology in Easterwood and Nutt (1999), we divide our sample into 
quartiles based on the sign and magnitude of lagged forecast errors. We define lagged forecast 
error as lagged forecast minus lagged actual earnings. We label the top quartile of observations 
“High Positive Lagged Error”, the bottom quartile “High Negative Lagged Error” and the middle 
two quartiles “Low Lagged Error”. We estimate the model separately for each sub-sample, and 
present the results in Table V. Overconfidence levels are highest among the high positive and 
high negative quartiles of lagged error, and there is no significant difference between the two 
groups.  Thus we see no evidence that overreaction to new information, which is the defining 
characteristic of overconfidence, is influenced in the way that an incentive-based argument 
would suggest. What we do observe is that the level of overconfidence is significantly lower in 
the Low Lagged Error subsample and that the quality of private information as measured by 
private signal precision is higher. This is consistent with the experimental findings cited above in 
which individuals are found to be more overconfident in situations where information is of lower 
quality.  
Cognitive dissonance is most evident among the low lagged forecast errors (i.e. when 
lagged absolute forecast errors are relatively small).  The dissonance bias is also significant 
among high negative lagged error forecasts (i.e. when the lagged analyst forecast was “too 
pessimistic”).  The dissonance bias is insignificant among high positive lagged error forecasts 
(i.e. when the lagged analyst forecast was “too optimistic”).  These findings run counter to the 
incentive-based predictions of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) but the cause of the 
observed asymmetry remains obscure. 
 
C. International Evidence 
Experimental studies have revealed systematic cross-cultural variations in 
overconfidence.  Asian subjects regularly display higher levels of overconfidence than their 
Western counterparts (Wright et al. 1978, Lee et al. 1995). Among Asian subjects the Japanese 
display lower levels of overconfidence (Yates et al. 1989, 1990).  In a detailed survey on cultural 
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perceptions of overconfidence, Yates et al. (1996) find that most Americans express surprise, and 
sometimes skepticism, when told that Asians are more overconfident than Americans.  
Moreover, while many studies measure overconfidence using general knowledge questions, 
Yates et al. (1998) demonstrate that the same cross-cultural variations exist in practical decision-
making contexts. If the analyst behavior documented in section IV is indeed due to 
overconfidence, then we should expect our estimates of overconfidence to vary across countries 
in a manner consistent with the psychological evidence. 
 
C.1. International Data Sources 
Our data set consists of all annual earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S International Detail 
History database and I/B/E/S Domestic Detail History database from 1993-1999.  Whereas 
analysts in the United States tend to issue both quarterly and annual earnings forecasts for firms, 
most international forecasts are issued only for annual earnings.  Thus, while previous sections of 
the paper used quarterly US earnings forecasts to estimate the model, this section utilizes annual 
US forecasts to provide a consistent basis for comparison with other countries. 
 To ensure a minimum level of accuracy in our parameter estimates, firms must have at 
least four years of annually-differenced earnings data to be included in our study. To eliminate 
potential outliers, we apply the same data filters as for quarterly data. Filter C is appropriately 
modified to apply to annual earnings forecasts so that our sample is restricted to all annual 
forecasts issued since the most recent annual earnings announcement. 
We normalize the data using a firm-specific volatility measure as follows: for each firm j, 
we calculate the variance of annually-differenced earnings ( )1,,2, −−= tjtjj AAVarεσ .  As before, 
we use the entire sample period to estimate the parameters. The estimated standard deviation, 
j,εσ , is then used to normalize the firm’s earnings. We refer to data normalized in this way as 
sigma-normalized data. 
 
C.2. Estimation Results for Annual US Forecasts 
Table VI contains parameter estimates for annual US earnings forecasts.  Comparing the 
results of Table VI to those of Table II (quarterly US earnings forecasts) reveals that the 
properties of quarterly and annual US forecasts are similar. As with quarterly forecasts, the 
unconditional annual consensus forecast precision increases sequentially with forecast order (in 
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both data sets, the forecast precision of the 15th ordered forecasts is about double the forecast 
precision of the second forecast).20  
Overconfidence parameter estimates are higher with annual data (a = 1.141) than with 
quarterly data (a = 0.937). Given the increase in uncertainty associated with annual forecasts this 
finding is consistent with the experimental evidence cited above. In the next section, we compare 
the properties of annual US earnings forecasts to those of international earnings forecasts. 
  
C.3.  Cross-Country Parameter Estimates 
Table VI presents parameter estimates from annual earnings forecasts for the US and 
Japan.  The sequential increase in consensus forecast precision in Japan is similar to patterns in 
US data. This precision increases with each sequential forecast.  Private signal precisions are in 
general substantially higher in the US than in Japan, suggesting that Japanese analysts have 
relatively less private information than US analysts. 
Analysts in Japan exhibit higher levels of overconfidence than their American 
counterparts. The overconfidence parameter in Japan is 1.575 with a standard error of 0.147.  We 
also find that the level of private signal precision is overall substantially lower in Japan. This 
means that there are potentially confounding effects on the measured level of overconfidence. On 
the one hand, poorer quality of information will tend to increase overconfidence, whereas the 
international experimental evidence cited above (Yates et al. 1989, 1990) would lead one to 
expect lower levels of overconfidence in Japan than in the US.  
We also look at cognitive bias parameter estimates for other East Asian nations and for 
Western Europe.  We calculate estimates from a pooled sample of annual earnings forecasts from 
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea 
and Thailand.  Overconfidence among these countries is somewhat higher than in the US (a = 
1.382 with a standard error of 0.107) although the difference is not significant. Given that levels 
of private signal precision are broadly comparable with those in the US (details omitted), this 
finding is (weakly) consistent with the experimental evidence. 
 In the case of Western Europe, the results from estimating the model on aggregate data 
give an estimate of 1.006 for the overconfidence parameter with a GMM standard error of 0.062.  
Thus we find that the results from our analysis of international data confirm the general finding 
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for the US, that analysts display overconfidence and that this has a substantial impact on earnings 
forecasts. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
We have presented a model of sequential earnings forecasts that enables us to use 
information on the second moment of forecast errors to test whether the forecasts are unbiased. 
We find strong evidence to suggest that analysts place too much weight on their private 
information, consistent with the model of investor overconfidence in Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998). We also show that past forecast errors influence current forecasts in a 
manner predicted by the theory of cognitive dissonance. We argue that these results are unlikely 
to have arisen solely as a result of a rational response to incentives, and present evidence to 
support the view that the misweighting stems from cognitive biases. Our results are consistent 
with findings in other fields. As Hirshleifer (2001) points out in his review of investor 
psychology, experts in many fields systematically suffer from these biases. We show also that 
the bias generated by overconfidence is sufficiently large to be of economic significance. 
Analysts place twice as much weight on their private information as is justified by rational 
Bayesian updating.  
In our framework in which analysts issue forecasts sequentially it becomes important to 
address the issue of how analysts interpret the forecasts of others. Our model delivers a simple 
test to determine whether analysts view other forecasts as unbiased or not. The test indicates that 
analysts make corrections for bias in the forecasts of others even though their own forecasts are 
subject to the same biases. 
We examine the way in which information quality proxied by the book-to-market ratio 
influences our measures of overconfidence and cognitive dissonance, and find strong effects 
consistent with experimental findings in the psychology literature. We show that the level of 
overconfidence varies with the firm’s book-to-market ratio in a manner consistent with the 
model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and the empirical findings of Daniel and 
Titman (1999). We also look at international data on the level of overconfidence and find some 
weak evidence that our measure varies as predicted by psychological experiments.  
Our model enables us to quantify cognitive biases across a large cross-section of stocks. 
This, in turn, will allow us to address a further series of questions relevant for assessing asset 
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pricing models based on investor overconfidence. Are the biases we measure associated with the 
presence of price momentum?  Does the magnitude of average cognitive bias vary with price-
dividend or price-earnings ratios through time?  These questions are ones we intend to pursue in 
future research. 
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Appendix A.1 
We derive the results contained in (6). Since the first forecast during period 1−t  is 
conditioned only on  and the first private signal, it can be written publictI 1−
( 1 1111 1,111,1 1, ˆ −−−− ++=+=− tttttttt SAF ηεππ πππ π ηε ηηε η )     (A.1.1) 
To show how the first forecast can be transformed into an unbiased signal about tε , we 
can write it as 
( ) 1 11,1 1,1 1 ˆ −−− +=−+ tttttt AF ηεπ ππ η ηε       (A.1.2) 
The forecast of the second analyst will combine the second private signal with the forecast 
already issued.  Using the rules for Bayesian updating, her expected earnings innovation is 
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Remembering that 
  
∑
=
+
= i
j
j
i
iw
1
ηε
η
ππ
π
        (A.1.4) 
and noting that  
        (A.1.5) [ 1 1,2 1,1,2 1, ,|ˆ −−−− += ttttttttt FSEAF ε ]
we find that 
( ) 2 1221 1,22 1, 1 −−− ++−= tttttt wAwFwF η       (A.1.6) 
and that in general 
( ) ititiittiitt wAwFwF 111,1, 1 −−−− ++−= η       (A.1.7) 
which is the form of equation (6) in the text. 
 
 
 28 
 
Appendix A.2 
We derive the results given in equations (11) and (12) of the text. The first analyst 
receives a private signal with true precision . Then the regression equation  1 1
1
1, −− += ttttS ηε 1ηπ
11
1,1 tttt Sb νε += −         (A.2.1) 
has the property that 
( )( ) 11
1
1
1,
1
1,
1 var
,cov
w
S
S
b
tt
ttt ≡+== −
−
ηε
η
ππ
πε
. The unbiased forecast conditional on 
 is 1 1, −ttS
          (A.2.2) 1 1,11,
1
1,
ˆ −−− += tttttt SwAF
and 1tν  is the forecast error. 
 The first biased forecast is given by 
         (A.2.3) 1 1,11,
1,
1,
ˆ −−− += ttBttBtt SwAF
and it follows that  
  ( ) 11,1, 1,
1
111
1,11,
ˆˆ
ttt
B
ttBttttttt AFw
wSwAA ννε +−=+==− −−−−    (A.2.4) 
Thus a regression of realized changes in earnings on biased forecasts will identify Bww 11 . But 
the first unbiased forecast is related to the first biased forecast as follows:  
  ( )1,1, 1,
1
11
1,11,
1
1,
ˆˆ −−−−− −==− ttBttBtttttt AFw
wSwAF      (A.2.5) 
 So the second analyst can infer the value of the unbiased forecast. Her forecast will then 
be 
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where  
  
( )
( ) 221
2
2
2 1
1
ηηε
η
πππ
π
a
a
wB +++
+= . 
 The relationship between the second unbiased forecast and the biased forecasts is 
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  ( ) ( ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+−=− −−−−−− 1,1, 1,11221,2, 1,221,2 1, ˆ1ˆˆ ttBttBBttBttBtttt AFwwwwAFwwAF )   (A.2.7) 
where 21
2
2
ηηε
η
πππ
π
++=w  is the unbiased weight for the private signal of the second analyst. 
 In general, the ith observed forecast will be given by 
  ( )( ) i ttBittittBittiBtt SwAFwAF 1,1,11,1,, 1, ˆ1ˆ −−−−−− +−−=−      (A.2.8) 
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which are the expressions in (11) and (12) of the text. 
 
Appendix B 
This section contains technical details for the GMM estimation of the rational and 
cognitive bias models.  The fundamental moment conditions are the same for both models, with 
the rational model imposing several parameter restrictions, described below.  The four 
fundamental moment conditions, in general form, are: 
[ ] 0, 1, =−−− itiBtt AFE μ          (B.1) 
{ } 01 1
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−−−
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− i
j
j
i
t
iB
tt AFE
ηε ππ
μ       (B.2) 
( )[ ] 0)1( 12,111,,01, =−−−−−− −−−−−− ti ttBitBiittBiiitt AFkwAwFwbFE     (B.3) 
( ){ } ( ) ( )[ ] 0)1( 12212,111,,01, =⋅−−−−−−− −−−−−−− iBiti ttBitBiittBiiitt wAFkwAwFwbFE ηπ  (B.4) 
where i = 1, 2,…, 16.  The parameter  measures the average forecast error for the iiμ th ordered 
forecast, thus controlling for any optimism or pessimism bias in the ith ordered forecast.  All 
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other parameters are as defined in the text.  Moment conditions (B.1) through (B.4) are estimated 
separately for each ordered forecast, yielding a total of 64 moment conditions.  The first and 
second sets of moment conditions yield estimates of sequential forecast bias and consensus 
forecast precision.  The third set of moment conditions represents the basic regression equation, 
and to obtain consistent estimates for the regression parameters, we cross-multiply each of the 
moment conditions in the third set by the instrument vector [ ]tiBttt AFZ ,,1 , 1, −= , which produces 32 
additional moment conditions, for a total of 96 moment conditions.  Recall that the orthogonality 
of At with the regression error term follows from the model.  The fourth set of moment 
conditions produces sequential estimates of private signal precision.  The following parameter 
restriction is imposed by both the rational model and the model with overconfidence and 
cognitive dissonance: 
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i
j
j
i
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+=
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       (B.5) 
The rational model imposes two additional restrictions: 
  a = 0          (B.6) 
k = 0          (B.7) 
Thus, the model with cognitive biases contains two more variables than the rational model. 
 
Estimation 
Write the set of all moment conditions as 
( )[ ] 0, =θtxfE         (B.8) 
where  represents the data and  the vector of parameters to be estimated.  The first-stage of 
our GMM procedure requires the minimization of the quadratic form of the following term: 
tx θ
( ) (∑
=
≡
N
i
tN xfN
g
1
,1 θθ ) .         (B.9) 
That is, the parameter estimates are given by: 
  ( ) ( )θθθ NN Wgg ′≡= q  whereq, minargˆ .      (B.10) 
As a first step, we estimate unrestricted parameters,  using 1ˆθ NNIW ×= .  These initial parameter 
estimates are consistent but inefficient, and are used to construct the asymptotically efficient 
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weight matrix S (Hansen (1982) shows that the optimal weight matrix is equal to the inverse of 
the covariance matrix of the moment conditions.  We calculate this matrix using the first-stage 
parameter estimates).  This efficient weight matrix is then used to calculate the second-stage 
GMM parameter estimates reported in the paper. 
 The nested nature of our model allows us to directly compare the rational and biased 
models.  Following Newey and West (1987) and Cochrane (2001), we define: 
        (B.11) edunrestrictrestricted qNqND ⋅−⋅=
where N equals the number of observations in our sample, and represents the second-stage 
minimized value of the GMM objective function for the restricted (rational) and unrestricted 
(cognitive bias) models.  D has an asymptotic Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of parameters in the unrestricted model minus the number of parameters in 
the restricted model.  Thus, . 
•q
2
)2(χ⎯→⎯aD
We have experimented with other GMM weighting schemes.  For example, we have 
employed a Limited Information estimation procedure, in which we first estimate the consensus 
precision parameters using the first two sets of moment conditions, then use these estimates to 
calculate the remaining parameters using an asymptotically efficient 2-stage procedure.  Other 
weighting schemes we have examined include estimating the cross-products of instruments times 
all equations in the third and fourth sets of moment conditions using the asymptotically efficient 
weight matrix; and estimating all moment conditions using a one-stage procedure with the 
identity weight matrix.  The parameter estimates across the methods obviously differ to some 
degree, but in all instances our fundamental results are unchanged.   
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 The theory was first expounded by Festinger (1957). It has been described as one of the most influential theories in 
social psychology (Jones, 1985) and has been the stimulus for a great number of experimental studies.  
 
2 The theory of cognitive dissonance has been applied in an economic context in Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and in 
a financial context in Goetzmann and Peles (1997). 
 
3 In the context of our model, the information content is implicitly measured by the improvement in forecast 
precision relative to the previously issued forecast.  This approach differs from other studies that use a market-based 
measure of information content.  For example, Gleason and Lee (2002) and Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) study the 
properties of analyst forecast revisions.  In those studies, each forecast’s information content is measured using 
market-based responses (excess returns or volume) to the forecast revision.  
 
4 Because we are examining the precision of the forecasts themselves, and not the precision of the parameters used 
to generate the forecasts, the mean squared forecast error is calculated by dividing the sum of the squared forecast 
errors by the number of observations (see Greene 1997, pp. 372-373).  However, the number of observations in our 
sample is so large that even if a loss of degrees of freedom in the regression parameters translated into a loss of 
degrees of freedom in the mean squared forecast error, the relative performance of the predictors would remain 
unchanged. 
 
5 Firms may punish analysts who issue negative or pessimistic forecasts by excluding them from conference calls (or 
other forms of direct contact with management), terminating correspondence, and even threatening legal or physical 
harm (Siconolfi 1995; Schultz 1990; Berg 1990). Michaely and Womack (1999) suggest that an analyst may issue 
more favorable forecasts for firms that have an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s company.   
 
6 Lim (2001) develops a model in which analyst forecast bias is fully rational, because it induces firm management 
to provide better information to the optimistic analyst.  The improved information is sufficient to decrease the 
analyst’s mean squared forecast error.   
 
7 McNichols, O’Brien and Francis (1997) find that analysts tend to drop coverage of firms that they expect to do 
poorly rather than retain them and issue negative comments. This incentive not to release unfavorable forecasts 
truncates the left tail of the forecast distribution, producing observationally biased forecasts even when the true 
forecast distribution is unbiased.  Other studies suggest that the observed upward bias is the result of discretionary 
asset write-downs (Keane and Runkle 1998) or skewed data (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2000). 
 
8Information on forecasts is easily accessible. I/B/E/S, Zack’s and First Call, the main providers of earnings forecast 
information, all offer real-time web-based access to forecast data. 
 
9 However we argue below that such incentives are likely to be insignificant in the context we consider. 
 
10 This would include a loss function equal to the mean squared forecast error. 
 
11 This assumes for notational simplicity that each analyst’s forecast appears at the same point in the forecast order 
in successive quarters. We do not assume that this is the case in the empirical analysis. 
 
12 We assume that large pieces of new public information are followed by two or more simultaneous forecasts.  By 
eliminating multiple forecast days from our regressions (though still including them in the information set of all 
subsequent forecasts), we aim to isolate the effect of private information on forecasts. 
 
13 Keane and Runkle (1998) find that including all earnings forecast observations in their analysis leads to rejection 
of the hypothesis of rational forecasts.  However, after eliminating outliers they can no longer reject the rational 
hypothesis. 
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14 Bernard and Thomas (1990) show that pooled, seasonally-differenced earnings are predictable using lagged values 
of differenced earnings, particularly at lags 1 and 2.  Clearly, earnings for some firms will be more predictable than 
others.  Thus, we extend Bernard and Thomas (1990) by fitting separate AR(2) models for each firm. 
 
15 Results are virtually identical when we eliminate observations +/- 4 standard deviations from the mean. 
 
16 This considerably simplifies the expression for the ith analyst’s forecast.  While this could theoretically bias our 
estimates, we doubt this is the case for two reasons.  First, since the median forecast error in our sample is zero, the 
lagged forecast errors of analysts j=1,2,…,i-1 may tend to cancel each other out, and incorporating them individually 
into the ith forecast may yield little benefit.  Second, as we demonstrate below, the economic significance of the 
cognitive dissonance bias is fairly small, and ignoring the cognitive dissonance bias in other forecasts would likely 
have little effect on the ith analyst’s own forecast precision.  In contrast, we also show below that the overconfidence 
bias is quite significant, both economically and statistically. 
 
17 In Table III, we utilize a consensus measure equal to a weighted average of all previously issued forecasts, where 
the weights are functions of the estimated cognitive bias parameters, as well as the estimated weights each past 
analyst placed on her private information.  We have also estimated the table with consensus measures equal to the 
average of all existing forecasts; the average of the most recent two, three or four forecasts; the most recent existing 
forecast; and the average of all forecasts issued in the past 30 days. In all cases, the results are similar. 
 
18 Zitzewitz (2001b) does allow the analyst to make multiple forecasts within a period, and shows that the incentive 
to overweight private information declines with the number of forecasts made.  
 
19 Firms with negative B-M ratios are excluded from the low B-M quartile, since firms with negative B-M ratios 
have properties very different from firms with small, positive B-M ratios. 
 
20 The large jump in precision from the 15th ordered forecast the "16th+" forecasts occurs because the "16th+" 
category contains not only the 16th forecasts, but all subsequent forecasts, whose precision continues to sequentially 
increase.  The pooled precision estimates are therefore higher than the precision for the 16th ordered forecasts alone. 
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Table I 
Sample Statistics for Raw and Sigma-Normalized Data 
Full sample includes all one- and two-quarter-ahead quarterly earnings forecasts in the I/B/E/S Domestic Detail File over the 1993-1999 period.  Actual earnings 
data are taken from the domestic I/B/E/S Actuals File.  To be included in the full sample, a firm must have at least 12 seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings 
observations.  Additional cumulative data filters are applied as follows: Filter A eliminates observations with Price < $5 per share.  Filter B eliminates 
observations from analysts with fewer than 25 total forecasts during the sample period, as well as all forecasts issued on multiple-forecast days (days on which 2 
or more forecasts are issued).  Filter C excludes forecasts made before the most recent past quarterly earnings announcement.  Filter D eliminates forecasts more 
than six standard deviations from actual reported earnings, where firm-specific standard deviations are estimated by fitting an AR(2) model to actual earnings 
over the entire sample period. It also eliminates forecasts for which no prior forecasts exist. 
 
                                                                                Panel A:  Raw Data                          Panel B:  Sigma-Normalized Data             
 
Variable 
Data 
Filter 
N. obs in 
sample 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
Dev 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
Dev 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
Actual 
Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Forecasted  
Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Error 
 
 
 
 
Full 
Filter A 
Filter B 
Filter C 
Filter D 
 
Full 
Filter A 
Filter B 
Filter C 
Filter D 
 
Full 
Filter A 
Filter B 
Filter C 
Filter D 
 
 
989,967 
909,046 
624,144 
389,233 
307,532 
 
989,967 
909,046 
624,144 
389,233 
307,532 
 
989,967 
909,046 
624,144 
389,233 
307,532 
 
 
 0.298 
0.322 
0.323 
0.323 
0.336 
 
0.374 
0.360 
0.361 
0.346 
0.356 
 
0.075 
0.037 
0.038 
0.024 
0.020 
 
 
0.235 
0.255 
0.250 
0.253 
0.268 
 
0.250 
0.270 
0.270 
0.260 
0.273 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
1.444 
1.386 
1.574 
1.558 
1.218 
 
36.986 
1.354 
1.535 
1.513 
1.184 
 
36.968 
0.582 
0.667 
0.717 
0.405 
 
 
-363.650 
-249.900 
-249.900 
-249.900 
-39.000 
 
-250.000 
-250.000 
-250.000 
-250.000 
-11.667 
 
-247.200 
-247.200 
-247.200 
-247.200 
-22.130 
 
 
125.970 
125.970 
125.970 
125.970 
125.970 
 
36875.0 
143.060 
143.060 
143.060 
131.050 
 
36874.3 
218.400 
218.400 
218.400 
65.730 
 
 
 3.784 
4.024 
3.883 
3.838 
4.013 
 
3.922 
4.157 
4.014 
3.896 
4.057 
 
0.138 
0.132 
0.131 
0.059 
0.044 
 
 
2.245 
2.459 
2.372 
2.359 
2.482 
 
2.342 
2.551 
2.463 
2.379 
2.500 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
5.506 
5.641 
5.469 
5.382 
5.519 
 
8.451 
5.626 
5.489 
5.458 
5.437 
 
6.552 
1.297 
1.382 
1.469 
0.712 
 
 
-10.254 
-10.254 
-10.254 
-10.254 
-10.254 
 
-283.404 
-283.404 
-283.404 
-283.404 
-10.928 
 
-280.230 
-280.230 
-280.230 
-280.230 
-5.975 
 
 
63.321 
63.321 
63.321 
63.321 
63.076 
 
6384.46 
582.781 
582.781 
582.781 
61.165 
 
6384.30 
576.953 
576.953 
576.953 
5.974 
 
 
Table II 
Regression of ith Analyst Forecast on Lagged Forecasts 
Table presents regression slope coefficients from a regression of the ith observed forecast, , on lagged forecast 
changes , j=1,2,…,i-1 and actual time-t earnings changes, .  Regressions include an intercept 
term, which is omitted for brevity.  For the 8
i
ttF 1, −
1,1,
ˆ −− − ttjtt AF 1,ˆ −− ttt AA
th and later ordered forecasts, we report only the coefficients on the first 
seven lagged forecasts.  Data reflect Filter D (see Table I).  is calculated using, and all data are normalized by, firm-
specific AR(2) standard errors. White Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors reported in parentheses. 
1,
ˆ −ttA
 
 Slope Coefficients 
Forecast 
order 
i 
 
 
i-1 
 
 
i-2 
 
 
i-3 
 
 
i-4 
 
 
i-5 
 
 
i-6 
 
 
i-7 
 
1,
ˆ −− ttt AA  
2 0.791       0.2039 
 (0.002)       (0.002) 
3 0.489 0.353      0.157 
 (0.004) (0.004)      (0.003) 
4 0.408 0.236 0.197     0.158 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)     (0.003) 
5 0.347 0.205 0.156 0.125    0.166 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)    (0.003) 
6 0.331 0.192 0.136 0.095 0.080   0.166 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)   (0.004) 
7 0.330 0.180 0.145 0.089 0.046 0.050  0.157 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.004) 
8 0.281 0.248 0.114 0.072 0.044 0.030 0.044 0.167 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
9 0.312 0.195 0.129 0.079 0.065 0.041 0.020 0.157 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
10 0.297 0.184 0.113 0.099 0.074 0.037 0.036 0.161 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
11 0.236 0.175 0.181 0.095 0.070 0.040 0.016 0.186 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
12 0.237 0.223 0.113 0.116 0.100 0.057 0.005 0.147 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.009) 
13 0.227 0.159 0.154 0.134 0.050 0.081 0.023 0.171 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) 
14 0.187 0.310 0.110 0.091 0.075 0.074 0.018 0.133 
 (0.002) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) 
15 0.179 0.219 0.089 0.149 0.119 0.229 0.072 0.148 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
16+ 0.192 0.113 0.189 0.119 0.139 0.034 0.071 0.142 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
         
 
 
 
 
 
Table III 
GMM Estimation and Model Comparison 
Regressions below estimate (i) the rational model equation ( ) ititiittiiitt wAwFwbF 11,,01, 1 −−− ++−+= η , and (ii) the 
equation for the model with cognitive bias ( ) ( ) itBitiB ttBitBiiBttBiiiBtt wAFkwAwFwbF 11, 2,1, 1,,0, 1, 1 −−−−−− +−++−+= η  
where  ( ) is the iittF 1, −
iB
ttF
,
1, −
th sequential analyst forecast, ittF 1, −  (
iB
ttF
,
1, − ) is the consensus defined as a weighted average of 
all previously issued forecasts, where the weights are functions of the estimated cognitive bias parameters, as well as the 
estimated weights each past analyst placed on her private information., and  is the actual quarterly earnings reported at 
time t.  Data reflect Filter D (see Table I). All data are normalized by firm-specific AR(2) standard errors. See text and 
Appendix for details of GMM estimation.  The Newey-West D-statistic equals N times the minimized value of the GMM 
objective function in the restricted (rational) model, minus the same statistic from the unrestricted model.  This statistic 
has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. GMM standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
tA
 
Rational Model Model with Cognitive Bias 
 
Forecast 
order 
 
 
Constant 
 
Consensus 
precision 
Private 
signal 
precision 
 
Implied  iw
 
 
Constant 
 
Consensus 
precision 
Private 
signal 
precision 
 
Implied  Biw
1 0.106 1.512 0.417 0.22 0.112 1.528 0.168 0.18 
 (0.005) (0.023)  (0.015)   (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.007)   
2 0.089 1.813 0.428 0.19 0.099 1.706 0.166 0.16 
 (0.004) (0.038)  (0.025)   (0.004)  (0.023)  (0.008)   
3 0.076 2.049 0.397 0.16 0.087 1.825 0.180 0.16 
 (0.004) (0.032)  (0.017)   (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.007)   
4 0.028 2.215 0.805 0.27 0.035 1.911 0.217 0.18 
 (0.004) (0.040)  (0.044)   (0.003) (0.023)  (0.010)   
5 0.052 2.356 0.523 0.18 0.060 2.027 0.222 0.18 
 (0.004) (0.047)  (0.026)   (0.004)  (0.029)  (0.010)   
6 0.043 2.565 0.601 0.19 0.047 2.195 0.243 0.18 
 (0.004) (0.057)  (0.032)   (0.004)  (0.035)  (0.012)   
7 0.035 2.902 0.574 0.17 0.036 2.372 0.264 0.18 
 (0.004) (0.080)  (0.041)   (0.004)  (0.044)  (0.017)   
8 -0.009 3.057 1.487 0.33 -0.011 2.496 0.319 0.20 
 (0.004) (0.092)  (0.133)   (0.004)  (0.046)  (0.022)   
9 -0.026 3.168 1.430 0.31 -0.027 2.565 0.322 0.20 
 (0.004) (0.109)  (0.149)   (0.004)  (0.052)  (0.027)   
10 -0.033 3.513 1.864 0.35 -0.036 2.845 0.376 0.20 
 (0.004)  (0.140)  (0.233)   (0.005)  (0.065)  (0.034)   
11 -0.046 3.870 2.225 0.37 -0.050 3.171 0.565 0.26 
 (0.005)  (0.181)  (0.288)   (0.006)  (0.094)  (0.059)   
12 -0.052 4.142 1.763 0.30 -0.054 3.354 0.495 0.22 
 (0.006) (0.236)  (0.283)   (0.006)  (0.118)  (0.066)   
13 -0.064 4.509 2.279 0.34 -0.067 3.737 0.648 0.25 
 (0.007) (0.278)  (0.384)   (0.007)  (0.161)  (0.091)   
14 -0.074 4.723 2.380 0.34 -0.080 4.135 0.755 0.26 
 (0.008) (0.329)  (0.491)   (0.007)  (0.221)  (0.145)   
15 -0.084 5.517 2.607 0.32 -0.095 4.696 0.881 0.27 
 (0.010) (0.472)  (0.592)   (0.008)  (0.0311  (0.189)   
16+ -0.010 6.108 3.429 0.36 -0.115 5.138 1.090 0.29 
 (0.010) (0.892)  (1.24)   (0.009)  (0.538)  (0.325)   
         
 D 
statistic 
1,713.43 
(p-val 
<10-20) 
  Cognitive 
bias 
parameters 
   
     a 0.937   
      (0.027)   
     k 0.079   
      (0.0073)   
Table IV 
GMM Estimation of Model with Cognitive Biases 
High and Low Book-to-Market Firms 
Each year t, firms are divided into high, low and medium B-M categories based on the cross-sectional distribution of B-M 
ratios as of the previous fiscal year-end (t - 1).  Following Fama and French (1992), we include a six-month lag between 
the previous fiscal year-end and our forecasts.  Thus, forecasts issued between July of year t and June 30 of year t + 1 are 
sorted according to the B-M ratio as of the previous fiscal year-end (t - 1).  For instance, using the 1993 fiscal-year-end B-
M ratios for each firm, we calculate the cross-sectional distribution of these ratios, and group firms according to their 
relative position.  All forecasts issued between 7/1/94 and 6/30/95 are then assigned to the appropriate subsample based 
on the firm's B-M ratio as of 1993 year end.  This process is repeated for each year in the sample.  B-M data are obtained 
from the Compustat Industrials file, and equal the book value of equity (items 60) divided by the market value of equity 
(item 24 times item 25). The model is estimated separately for each group. The model and estimation procedure are as 
described in the notes to Table II. GMM standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates.   
 
     Low Book-to-Market 
Firms 
 Medium Book-to-
Market Firms 
 High Book-to-Market 
Firms 
 
Forecast 
Order 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
2  1.726 0.170  1.685 1.685  1.719 0.174 
  (0.038) (0.012)   (0.033)  (0.011)   (0.057)  (0.017)  
3  1.815 0.175  1.853 1.852  1.803 0.178 
  (0.042) (0.012)   (0.030)  (0.010)   (0.066)  (0.018)  
4  1.879 0.193  1.951 1.951  1.918 0.248 
  (0.042) (0.017)   (0.033)  (0.015)   (0.083)  (0.035)  
5  1.854 0.208  2.107 2.107  2.175 0.280 
  (0.051) (0.018)   (0.039)  (0.014)   (0.094)  (0.036)  
6  2.007 0.192  2.294 2.294  2.314 0.285 
  (0.061) (0.018)   (0.050)  (0.017)   (0.119)  (0.040)  
7  2.082 0.197  2.475 2.475  2.701 0.316 
  (0.072) (0.021)   (0.062)  (0.021)   (0.163)  (0.051)  
8  2.114 0.220  2.690 2.691  2.687 0.327 
  (0.068) (0.026)   (0.070)  (0.034)   (0.184)  (0.061)  
9  2.038 0.201  2.738 2.739  3.069 0.443 
  (0.070) (0.026)   (0.075)  (0.043)   (0.227)  (0.083)  
10  2.398 0.305  3.082 3.082  3.170 0.465 
  (0.102) (0.043)   (0.091)  (0.053)   (0.308)  (0.112)  
11  2.589 0.443  3.344 3.344  4.007 0.866 
  (0.145) (0.078)   (0.117)  (0.079)   (0.446)  (0.225) 
12  3.090 0.470  3.469 3.469  3.440 0.732 
  (0.198) (0.092)   (0.147)  (0.069)   (0.435)  (0.284)  
13  3.120 0.464  4.086 4.086  4.228 1.381 
  (0.224) (0.092)   (0.237)  (0.107)   (0.628)  (0.385)  
14  3.844 0.568  4.045 4.045  5.505 1.016 
  (0.373) (0.220)   (0.285)  (0.122)   (0.990)  (0.505)  
15  3.991 0.984  4.857 4.827  5.993 0.997 
  (0.495) (0.399)   (0.447)  (0.251)   (1.301)  (0.539)  
16+  3.696 0.814  5.781 5.780  10.678 8.075 
  (1.131) (0.604)   (0.604)  (0.411)   (2.220)  (3.447)  
Cognitive 
Bias 
Parameters 
         
a  1.040   0.908   0.752  
  (0.046)   (0.035)   (0.050)  
k  0.103   0.074   0.028  
  (0.014)   (0.009)   (0.015)  
Avg. B-M 
ratio  0.139   0.465   0.962  
  
Table V 
Full-Information GMM Estimation of Model with Cognitive Biases 
Positive and Negative Lagged Forecast Error 
Following Easterwood and Nutt (1999), we use the distribution of lagged errors to partition the sample into quartiles 
based upon the sign and magnitude of the lagged error.  Lagged forecast error is defined as lagged forecast minus lagged 
actual earnings.  We label the top quartile of observations "High Positive Lagged Error", the middle two quartiles "Low 
Lagged Error", and the bottom quartile "High Negative Lagged Error".  The model is estimated separately for each group. 
The model and estimation procedure are as described in the notes to Table II. GMM standard errors are reported in 
parentheses under coefficient estimates.   
 
     High Positive Lagged  
Error 
 Low Lagged Error  High Negative Lagged 
Error 
 
Forecast 
Order 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
  
Consensus 
Precision 
Private 
Signal 
Precision 
2  1.194 0.108  2.460 0.240  1.804 0.182 
  (0.033) (0.008)  (0.053) (0.014)  (0.042) (0.012) 
3  1.365 0.102  2.539 0.280  1.892 0.174 
  (0.031) (0.008)  (0.061) (0.018)  (0.051) (0.013) 
4  1.404 0.094  2.646 0.343  2.138 0.285 
  (0.035) (0.009)  (0.071) (0.026)  (0.062) (0.025) 
5  1.546 0.121  2.849 0.375  2.199 0.244 
  (0.046) (0.012)  (0.086) (0.028)  (0.074) (0.020) 
6  1.625 0.132  3.037 0.389  2.450 0.298 
  (0.054) (0.013)  (0.106) (0.030)  (0.091) (0.028) 
7  1.706 0.137  3.324 0.469  2.790 0.284 
  (0.061) (0.017)  (0.128) (0.044)  (0.115) (0.035) 
8  1.759 0.135  3.799 0.663  2.944 0.503 
  (0.068) (0.016)  (0.177) (0.078)  (0.147) (0.074) 
9  1.771 0.123  3.812 0.580  3.150 0.451 
  (0.074) (0.014)  (0.208) (0.079)  (0.183) (0.077) 
10  1.820 0.139  4.205 0.613  3.600 0.594 
  (0.083) (0.019)  (0.249) (0.100)  (0.225) (0.105) 
11  2.010 0.225  4.487 0.792  3.910 0.871 
  (0.111) (0.041)  (0.307) (0.138)  (0.261)  (0.153) 
12  2.480 0.188  4.163 0.571  4.171 0.818 
  (0.192) (0.050)  (0.325) (0.109)  (0.394) (0.191) 
13  2.479 0.191  5.105 1.161  4.592 0.721 
  (0.209) (0.045)  (0.414) (0.241)  (0.419) (0.172) 
14  2.348 0.149  5.759 1.076  4.780 0.834 
  (0.226) (0.046)  (0.500) (0.227)  (0.481) (0.237) 
15  2.553 0.182  6.879 1.093  4.551 0.887 
  (0.241) (0.048)  (0.782) (0.324)  (0.591) (0.305) 
16+  3.363 0.331  6.752 1.372  3.993 0.700 
  (0.282) (0.080)  (0.995) (0.462)  (0.858) (0.344) 
          
Cognitive 
Bias 
Parameters 
         
a  1.229   0.777   1.280  
  (0.047)   (0.033)   (0.056)  
k  0.008   0.202   0.071  
  (0.011)   (0.075)   (0.016)  
Mean Forecast          
Error  0.864   -0.053   -0.887  
 
 
 
Table VI 
GMM Estimation of Model with Cognitive Biases 
Annual I/B/E/S Earnings Forecasts  -  United States and Japan 
Parameter estimates are obtained by estimating the equation for the model with cognitive bias ( ) ( ) itBitiB ttBitBiiBttBiiiBtt wAFkwAwFwbF 11, 2,1,1,,0, 1, 1 −−−−−− +−++−+= η  where  is the iiBttF , 1, − th sequential analyst forecast, 
iB
ttF
,
1, −  is the consensus, equal to a weighted average of past forecasts, as specified in section 3 of the paper, and  is the 
actual annual earnings reported at time t.   Data reflect Filter D (see Table I). All data are normalized by firm-specific 
standard errors. See text and Appendix for details of GMM estimation.   
tA
 
 
      
United States 
  
Japan 
Forecast 
Order 
 Consensus 
Precision 
Private Signal 
Precision 
 Consensus 
Precision 
Private Signal 
Precision 
2  3.025 0.466  2.741 0.218 
  (0.139) (0.058)  (0.183) (0.045) 
3  3.481 0.663  3.101 0.288 
  (0.255) (0.080)  (0.247) (0.068) 
4  4.834 1.767  3.739 0.313 
  (0.506) (0.266)  (0.290) (0.079) 
5  3.216 0.651  3.991 0.333 
  (0.282) (0.108)  (0.367) (0.094) 
6  4.475 0.829  4.652 0.548 
  (0.253) (0.114)  (0.417) (0.159) 
7  4.582 0.662  4.885 0.441 
  (0.324) (0.123)  (0.539) (0.143) 
8  5.541 1.191  5.322 0.870 
  (0.332) (0.237)  (0.771) (0.378) 
9  5.055 2.185  6.457 0.703 
  (0.740) (0.406)  (0.935) (0.254) 
10  5.678 1.773  4.713 0.417 
  (0.623) (0.400)  (0.822) (0.240) 
11  6.015 1.626  5.254 0.563 
  (0.614) (0.373)  (1.258) (0.340) 
12  6.369 1.813  6.052 1.069 
  (0.597) (0.496)  (0.809) (0.435) 
13  6.632 2.305  11.911 5.054 
  (0.687) (0.455)  (2.911) (2.382) 
14  7.511 1.628  7.445 0.481 
  (0.591) (0.414)  (1.483) (0.132) 
15  7.146 1.883  9.580 1.026 
  (0.765) (0.588)  (1.674) (0.548) 
16+  8.063 2.436  10.902 1.465 
  (0.740) (0.529)  (1.427) (0.351) 
       
Cognitive 
Bias 
Parameters 
      
a  1.141   1.575  
  (0.065)   (0.147)  
k  0.024   0.038  
  (0.014)   (0.036)  
Num. Obs.  148,244   11,672  
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Figure 1:  Forecast Precision by Forecast Order 
Figure plots the forecast precision for three forecasting variables of actual time t earnings.  The forecasting variables are 
labeled  through .  The current (i1 1, −ttFV
3
1, −ttFV th) analyst’s actual forecast is labeled .     is generated by 
regressing actual earnings on observable lagged forecasts, 
1
1, −ttFV
2
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1
11,
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j
j
ttF .    is generated by regressing actual earnings 
on observable lagged forecasts, 
3
1, −ttFV
1
11,
−
=−
i
j
j
ttF , as well as the current (ith) analyst’s actual forecast.  Forecast precision is equal 
to the inverse sample mean-squared forecast error for each ordered forecast.  Forecasting parameters are re-estimated each 
quarter, using all earnings data from previous quarters. Any difference in forecast precision between  and  
is due to mis-weighting of information contained in the current and lagged forecasts.   
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Figure 2:  Efficiency Loss in Forecast Precision Due to Analyst Cognitive Biases  
Figure expresses the percentage difference between the forecast precision of the current (ith) analyst’s actual forecast 
and .   The reported values are equal to the  precision divided by the precision of minus 
one.  The current (i
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Figure 3.  Consensus Forecast:  Theoretical Weights on Lagged Forecasts. 
The figure plots the efficient Bayesian weights placed on lagged forecasts to form an efficient consensus forecast.  The 
actual weights on lagged forecasts are described in equation (11) in the text, and in general depend upon the precision of 
the initial information set, precision of past analyst private signals, and the degree of overconfidence exhibited by each 
past analyst.  The weights above illustrate a special case with initial precision , constant private signal 
precision  and constant overconfidence (a=1).   
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Figure 4:  Efficiency Loss in Forecast Precision Due to Analyst Cognitive Biases  
Figure expresses the percentage difference between the the current (ith) analyst’s actual forecast precision and the current 
(ith) efficient forecast.  The  (ith) efficient forecast is a weighted average of the current (ith) and past forecasts, with weights 
calculated according to equation (11) in the text.  The difference between the efficient and actual forecast precisions 
represents the efficiency loss due to overconfidence and cognitive dissonance biases.  Forecast precision is equal to the 
inverse sample mean-squared forecast error for each ordered forecast.  The ith analyst could eliminate this efficiency loss 
by efficiently combining the ith  private signal with the efficient consensus forecast. 
